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This book is about consumer contracts. It traces design features common among multiple types of consumer contracts and explores and explains the forces responsible for these design features. Why, for example, do sellers design contracts to provide short-term benefi ts and impose long-term costs? Why are low introductory prices so common? Why are cell phones given away for free, so long as the consumer signs a two-year service contract?
Why are the contracts themselves so complex? What's the rationale behind creating credit card and mortgage contracts featuring numerous fees and interest rates calculated via complex formulas? Why do cellular service contracts use complicated, three-part tariff pricing-a fi xed monthly fee, a number of included minutes, and an overage fee for minutes used beyond the plan limit-and then further complicate matters by distinguishing between peak minutes, night and weekend minutes, innetwork and out-of-network minutes, minutes used to call a pre-set list of "friends," and minutes used to call everyone else? Separate and equally complex pricing structures are developed and enforced for messaging and data services.
While clearly contributing to a consumer contract's complexity, a contract's "fi ne print" is not the focus of this book. That no one reads the fi ne print is old news. That sellers hide one-sided terms in the fi ne print is not surprising. The goal of Seduction by Contract is to explain the design of pricing structures and other contract terms that are often clearly disclosed-"dickered terms" that consumers are aware of and consent to.
Market Forces and Consumer Psychology
A main theme of this book is that the design of consumer contracts can be explained as the result of the interaction between market forces and consumer psychology. We consumers are imperfectly rational, our decisions and choices infl uenced by bias and misperception. Moreover, the mistakes we make are systematic and predictable. Sellers respond to those mistakes. They design products, contracts, and pricing schemes to maximize not the true (net) benefi t from their product, but the (net) benefi t as perceived by the imperfectly rational consumer . Consumers are lured, by contract design, to purchase products and services that appear more attract ive than they really are. This Seduction by Contract results in a behavioral market failure.
Competition, many believe, works to increase effi ciency and protect consumers. But competition does not alleviate the behavioral market failure. It may even exacerbate it. Here's why: In a competitive market, sellers have no choice but to align contract design with the psychology of consumers. A high-road seller who offers what she knows to be the best contract will lose business to the low-road seller who offers what the consumer mistakenly believes to be the best contract. Put bluntly, competition forces sellers to exploit the biases and misperceptions of their customers.
The interaction between market forces and consumer psychology explains many of the complex design features so common in consumer contracts. The temporal ordering of costs and benefi ts-with benefi ts accelerated and costs deferred-is linked to consumer myopia and optimism. Complexity responds to bounded rationality, to the challenge of remembering and then aggregating multiple dimensions of costs and benefi ts. These two features-complexity and cost deferral-serve one ultimate purpose: to maximize the (net) benefi t from the product, as perceived by the imperfectly rational consumer.
This behavioral-economics theory is subject to the standard critique that questions the robustness of the underlying biases and misperceptions in a market setting. I take this critique seriously. Therefore, I begin by studying possible rational-choice, effi ciency-based explanations for specifi c contract design features. Only when I conclude that the rational-choice accounts are unconvincing or incomplete do I develop the behavioral economics alternative. The prevalence of contracts and prices that cannot be fully explained within a rational-choice framework proves the robustness of the biases and misperceptions driving the behavioral-economics theory.
A main goal of this book is to explain the design of consumer contracts. But the descriptive story is the beginning, not the end. Understanding consumer contracts as the product of an interaction between market forces and consumer psychology raises a host of normative questions and legal policy challenges. Addressing these questions and challenges is another main ambition of this book.
Social Costs of the Behavioral Market Failure
The behavioral market failure mentioned earlier threatens social welfare at several levels. As contractual complexity increases in response to consumers' imperfect rationality, the cost of comparison shopping also increases, resulting in hindered competition. Recall the complex, multidimensional cell phone contract. Now imagine an imperfectly rational consumer trying to choose among several such complex, multidimensional contracts. The task is a daunting one. Many consumers will simply avoid it. Markets don't work well when consumers do not shop for the best deal. In the absence of effective comparison-shopping, prices rise, hurting consumers. Also, consumers who do not compare offers from different sellers might not be matched with the seller that best fi ts their needs. This reduces market effi ciency.
While hindered competition reduces social welfare, even intense competition would not ameliorate the behavioral market failure. The competitive forces that remain would work to maximize the perceived (net) benefi t rather than the actual (net) benefi t from the product. Specifi cally, shortterm, salient prices would be reduced while long-term non-salient prices would be increased. Examples of this dynamic are the low credit card teaserrates accompanied by high back-end fees and rates, or the free cell phones that you get when you "agree" to pay a host of usage fees and penalties for the duration of the two-year lock-in contract.
Prices that are salience-based rather than cost-based produce skewed incentives-for both product choice and product use. And as the perceived total price falls below the actual total price, demand for the product becomes artifi cially infl ated. For example and as we will see later in the book, infl ated demand for subprime mortgages, fueled by contract design , contributed to the subprime expansion and, later, to the subprime meltdown of 2008.
Finally, complexity and deferred costs raise distributional concerns, since their effects are not evenly distributed across different groups of consumers.
The interaction between market forces and consumer psychology, then, creates a market failure. This behavioral market failure imposes substantial welfare costs. Can legal intervention help? A comprehensive answer is beyond the scope of this book. Instead, the book focuses on a single regulatory technique: disclosure mandates. It develops a new approach to disclosure, one that directly responds to the imperfect rationality problem.
Toward More Effective Disclosure Mandates
While existing disclosure mandates focus largely on product attribute information-what the product is and what it does-the analysis and fi ndings described in this book suggest that more attention should be given to the disclosure of product-use information, namely, how the product will be used by the consumer. Rational consumers can be expected to predict their future-use patterns fairly accurately or at least know their own use patterns better than the sellers do. Disclosure of product-use information by sellers is, therefore, superfl uous in a rational-choice framework.
The same is not true, however, when consumers are imperfectly rational. As we will see, consumers often have a poor sense of their future use patterns. Do you know how much you talk on your cell phone? How many text messages you send and receive? How many megabytes of data you use? Do you how much you will borrow on your credit card? How fast you will pay down your balance? Whether you will ever require a cash advance? How likely are you to miss a payment and incur a late fee? The imperfectly rational consumer can benefi t substantially from disclosure of product-use information-information that sellers, like cell phone companies and credit card issuers, make it their business to know.
Moreover, the imperfect rationality of consumers suggests that, to be effective, disclosure regulation must adopt one of the following two strategies:
• First, simple disclosures that target consumers. The idea is to design aggregate, one-dimensional disclosures that facilitate comparison between competing products. For example, cell phone companies could be required to disclose the total annual cost of using a cell phone. The disclosure would combine both product-attribute information and product-use information. The annual cost of cellular service would combine rate information with the consumer's use-pattern information. Such simple, aggregate disclosures would help imperfectly rational consumers make better choices.
• Second, re-conceptualized disclosure aimed not at imperfectly rational consumers, but at sophisticated intermediaries. Accordingly, this disclosure could be more comprehensive and complex. Consider a consumer who is considering switching from her current cell phone company to a competing provider. Consider also an intermediary who wishes to help the consumer identify the best plan for her needs. The intermediary has information on the different plans offered by all cell phone companies. The intermediary, however, has little information on how the specifi c consumer uses her cell phone. Since different plans can be optimal for different consumers, depending on their use patterns, not having product-use information substantially reduces the ability of the intermediary to offer the most valuable advice. Now, the consumer's current cell phone company has a lot of information on the consumer's use patterns. It could be required to disclose this information in electronic form so that the consumer could forward it to the intermediary. The intermediary could then combine the product-use information with the information it has on different plans and provide the consumer with valuable advice. * * * This book aims to tell a general story about consumer contracts. But each consumer contract or, more accurately, each class of consumer contracts in each particular market has its own story. Accordingly, after fl eshing out common themes in Chapter 1 , the lion's share of the book is dedicated to three case studies of three important consumer markets-credit cards ( Chapter 2 ), mortgages ( Chapter 3 ), and cell phones ( Chapter 4 ). A detailed market-specifi c analysis is necessary to fully answer the descriptive question-why do these contracts look the way they do?-the normative question-what's wrong with these contracts?-and the prescriptive question-what can the law do to help?.
